TheoremComplete

Tarski's Undefinability Theorem

Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth shows that no sufficiently expressive formal language can define its own truth predicate. This result is closely related to Gödel's incompleteness theorems and reveals deep limitations of formal systems.


Statement

Theorem6.2Tarski's Undefinability Theorem

Let L\mathcal{L} be the language of arithmetic and N\mathbb{N} the standard model. There is no L\mathcal{L}-formula True(x)\mathrm{True}(x) such that for every L\mathcal{L}-sentence σ\sigma: NTrue(σ)    Nσ.\mathbb{N} \models \mathrm{True}(\ulcorner \sigma \urcorner) \iff \mathbb{N} \models \sigma. In other words, the set of Gödel numbers of true arithmetic sentences Th(N)\mathrm{Th}(\mathbb{N}) is not definable in N\mathbb{N}.


Proof

Proof

Suppose for contradiction that True(x)\mathrm{True}(x) is an L\mathcal{L}-formula satisfying NTrue(σ)    Nσ\mathbb{N} \models \mathrm{True}(\ulcorner \sigma \urcorner) \iff \mathbb{N} \models \sigma for all sentences σ\sigma.

By the diagonal lemma (which holds in N\mathbb{N} since it models PA), there exists a sentence λ\lambda such that: Nλ    N¬True(λ).\mathbb{N} \models \lambda \iff \mathbb{N} \models \neg \mathrm{True}(\ulcorner \lambda \urcorner).

But by the assumed property of True\mathrm{True}: NTrue(λ)    Nλ\mathbb{N} \models \mathrm{True}(\ulcorner \lambda \urcorner) \iff \mathbb{N} \models \lambda.

Combining: Nλ    N¬λ\mathbb{N} \models \lambda \iff \mathbb{N} \models \neg \lambda. This is a contradiction. \square


Consequences

ExamplePartial Truth Predicates

While the full truth predicate for LPA\mathcal{L}_{\text{PA}} is not definable in N\mathbb{N}, partial truth predicates exist. For each nn, there is a Σn\Sigma_n formula TrueΣn(x)\mathrm{True}_{\Sigma_n}(x) that correctly evaluates all Σn\Sigma_n sentences. The truth predicate for Σn\Sigma_n formulas is Πn\Pi_n-definable, which is one level higher in the arithmetic hierarchy.

RemarkRelationship to Gödel

Tarski's theorem can be seen as the semantic counterpart of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. Gödel showed that provability fails to capture truth; Tarski showed that truth itself cannot be internally defined. Both results use the diagonal lemma, but Gödel works with provability (ProvT\mathrm{Prov}_T) while Tarski works with truth (True\mathrm{True}).

RemarkLiar Paradox

Tarski's theorem is the formal resolution of the liar paradox ("this sentence is false"). The paradox arises because natural language can define its own truth predicate. Tarski's theorem shows that no formal language with sufficient expressive power can do so consistently, implying that the truth of a language must be defined in a richer metalanguage.