Tarski's Undefinability Theorem
Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth shows that no sufficiently expressive formal language can define its own truth predicate. This result is closely related to Gödel's incompleteness theorems and reveals deep limitations of formal systems.
Statement
Let be the language of arithmetic and the standard model. There is no -formula such that for every -sentence : In other words, the set of Gödel numbers of true arithmetic sentences is not definable in .
Proof
Suppose for contradiction that is an -formula satisfying for all sentences .
By the diagonal lemma (which holds in since it models PA), there exists a sentence such that:
But by the assumed property of : .
Combining: . This is a contradiction.
Consequences
While the full truth predicate for is not definable in , partial truth predicates exist. For each , there is a formula that correctly evaluates all sentences. The truth predicate for formulas is -definable, which is one level higher in the arithmetic hierarchy.
Tarski's theorem can be seen as the semantic counterpart of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. Gödel showed that provability fails to capture truth; Tarski showed that truth itself cannot be internally defined. Both results use the diagonal lemma, but Gödel works with provability () while Tarski works with truth ().
Tarski's theorem is the formal resolution of the liar paradox ("this sentence is false"). The paradox arises because natural language can define its own truth predicate. Tarski's theorem shows that no formal language with sufficient expressive power can do so consistently, implying that the truth of a language must be defined in a richer metalanguage.