Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem
Gödel's first incompleteness theorem establishes fundamental limitations on formal systems: any consistent, sufficiently expressive formal system contains statements that are true but unprovable. This shatters Hilbert's dream of a complete axiomatization of mathematics.
Statement
A theory in the language of arithmetic is sufficiently strong if it extends Robinson arithmetic (or equivalently, represents all computable functions). is -consistent if there is no formula with and for every .
Using the diagonal lemma applied to the formula (where formalizes " is the Gödel number of a sentence provable in "), there exists a sentence such that: The sentence asserts "I am not provable in ."
If is consistent: (if it did, then would be false in , but is meant to be sound). If is -consistent: (since is true in , and would mean "there exists a proof of ," but no standard number is such a proof). So is independent of .
Rosser's Improvement
Rosser's improvement weakens the hypothesis from -consistency to simple consistency: for any consistent, sufficiently strong theory , there exists a sentence that is independent of . The Rosser sentence says "for any proof of me, there is a shorter proof of my negation," using a more careful self-referential construction.
The first incompleteness theorem implies that no single formal system can serve as a complete foundation for mathematics. For any consistent axiom system (PA, ZFC, etc.), there are true arithmetic statements not provable in . Adding such statements as axioms produces a stronger system, but this too is incomplete.