Predicate Logic - Key Proof
Theorem (Compactness): A set of first-order sentences has a model if and only if every finite subset of has a model.
We prove compactness using Gödel's completeness theorem.
Direction (): If has a model , then is also a model of every subset of , including all finite subsets. This direction is trivial.
Direction (): Assume every finite subset of has a model. We must show has a model.
Step 1: Prove is consistent
Suppose for contradiction that is inconsistent, meaning (proves a contradiction). By the definition of formal proof, any derivation of uses only finitely many axioms. Therefore, there exists a finite subset such that .
By soundness of first-order logic, if , then , which means has no model. This contradicts our assumption that every finite subset of has a model.
Therefore, must be consistent.
Step 2: Apply completeness to obtain a model
By Gödel's completeness theorem, every consistent set of sentences has a model. Since we've shown is consistent, it follows that has a model.
Conclusion: We've shown that if every finite subset of has a model, then itself has a model, completing the proof.
Alternative Proof via Ultraproducts (sketch):
For readers familiar with ultraproducts, here's a model-theoretic proof that doesn't rely on completeness:
- Let be the set of all finite subsets of
- For each , let be a model of (exists by assumption)
- Let be an ultrafilter on containing all sets of the form for
- Form the ultraproduct
- By Łoś's theorem, for any sentence :
- For any , the set is in
- Therefore for all , so is a model of
Historical Note: The compactness theorem was first proved by Gödel in 1930 as a consequence of his completeness theorem. The ultraproduct proof came later with the development of model theory in the 1950s. Compactness is now recognized as one of the most fundamental properties of first-order logic, with applications spanning all areas of mathematics.
The compactness theorem fails for many extensions of first-order logic, including second-order logic and infinitary logics like . This failure is often seen as a limitation of these richer logics, but it also gives them greater expressive power—they can characterize properties that first-order logic cannot, precisely because they lack compactness.